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Introduction: The Ambivalences of Abstraction 
Celia Lury and Mike Michael 
Abstraction is a term that commonly carries negative connotations. So, for example, it is 
frequently opposed to lived experience – that is, abstraction is presented as a reduction of 
the richness and complexity of everyday life. In other negative uses, abstraction is held to 
involve an erasure of difference in a process of homogenization or generalization, as for 
example when the creation of classes or classifications of types denies the full expression of 
singular cases, individuality and particularity. Abstraction, it is claimed, is indifferent to the 
particular and therefore incapable of generating or promoting difference. If abstraction 
does generate difference, it does so, it is presumed, only in calculable terms, defined in 
relation to a fixed number of possibilities. Abstraction is also used negatively to indicate a 
preoccupied state of mind or to describe cognitive states, types of thoughts that are 
oblivious to events (as in abstract thought). Abstraction in these negative senses is always in 
need of specification, in more ways than one.   
 
Rather than restricting abstraction to these negative uses (which paradoxically themselves 
often rely on the mode of abstraction they describe), this collection examines practices of 
abstraction rather than abstraction as such: that is, the collection is concerned with the 
doing of abstraction.  This focus allows the authors to recognise abstraction as a 
characteristic of many everyday as well as scientific, technical and economic practices. And 
to do so without assuming that these practices refer to orders or levels of culture or society 
established a priori, while nonetheless pointing to the ways in which practices of abstraction 
are a means to organize and coordinate society. And while the authors consider whether 
and how such practices variously involve recognized characteristics of abstraction: 
detachment from or avoidance of representational qualities; identification and isolation of 
common features or attributes to create classifications, types or genres; processes of de- 
and re-contextualisation; practices of extraction; the pre-occupation of mind – they are also 
attentive to the ways in which practices of abstraction work with and against other specific, 
situated practices, and do so more or less successfully. A shared focus, then, is on the way in 
which practices of abstraction do not go uncontested, but must be accounted for, often as a 
product of concrete work which – ironically - itself may become an abstraction.  
 
In the pages that follow, abstraction can be found in the Anthropocenic calls for a 
politicization of geophyisics (Tironi); in new forms of experience money such as Apple Pay 
and their relation to existing accounts of money (Tkacz); as a constitutive component in the 
ontology of social scientific methodology (Michael);  as virtualities, both real and ideal but 
not actual (Shields); as central to innovation processes in mathematical and computational 
methods (Spencer);  as a mode of thought that has consecutively distanced and 
domesticated ‘nature’ (Chandler);  and in the performed behaviours of people enrolled in an 
electricity load experiment (Grandclement). This array of abstractions reminds us of a 
central irony of abstraction – that it is itself not easy to abstract.    
 
If we try to abstract a version of abstraction that echoes across the papers (at least as a 
starting point), it might invoke generalization from the particular, and the allied bracketing 
of the specific and the situated, in order to derive (or reflect) categories of comparison. But 
this abstracted articulation of abstraction is too specific - it is too epistemological (Michael) 
or uncritical (Chandler). Moreover, it says little about the practices by which abstraction is 
attempted if not always accomplished. For instance, abstraction can be manifested through 
self-conscious performance (Grandclement, Tkacz, Spencer), or exemplified in the caricature 
of the geosciences that affords their critique (Tironi).    
 
The contributions collected here show how the ‘negative’ abstraction of abstraction leaves 
open the multiple ‘others’ against which ‘abstraction’ is articulated.  Put otherwise, a solely 
negative account avoids acknowledging what abstraction is a movement away from, what it 
is working against, the interrelations of abstraction and its others, not simply descriptively, 
but also speculatively, making it hard to explore how such inter-relations can be/are being 
revitalized (rather than reinforced). In contrast, our authors identify and describe the 
emergent involutions of abstraction and its others through, say, the production of liminal 
events (for example, Shields), or the composition of modes of care (Michael), or the 
promotion of a sort of ‘hyper-abstraction’ (for example, Chandler). In exploring the 
ambivalence of abstraction, in describing what abstraction works against, the authors 
highlight the interruptions, disturbances and glitches that emerge in the movement from 
the empirical to the formal, the particular to the general, and back. They recognize the 
ambivalences of abstraction and in doing so develop a more ambivalent relation to 
abstraction than a solely negative account will allow. 
 
To further this concern with the ambivalence of abstraction, and drawing on the accounts 
the authors to this Special Issue raise, we list a short series of basic questions to ask of 
abstraction: When, where and how does abstraction take place? What are the practices and 
means by which abstraction is attempted or accomplished? On what do these practices or 
means work? In other words, what are the (specific) ‘others’ of this (specific) abstraction? 
What does abstraction ‘do’? In what way is abstraction productive or positive, negating or 
negative? What are the qualities of abstraction? What resists abstraction? Can abstraction 
itself be a mode of resistance? What are the emergent, or ambiguous, relations between 
abstraction and its others? How might these be enhanced, better involuted, and rendered 
‘positive’? And in what does that ‘positivity’ consist? To be sure these are simple questions, 
but they might together serve as a prompt to a more expansive and elaborated list. Such a 
list, we hope, would invite a more pronounced circumspection over our own respective uses 
– and practices - of abstraction. Ideally it resources a collective recognition that abstraction 
is itself an abstraction, even if that recognition also entails something of the negative and 
positive qualities of the abstract.  
 
 
